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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, R.I.**

**FIGHTING ANOTHER BANANA WAR:  
CAMPAIGN PLANNING IN THE HORN OF AFRICA**

by

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**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

**Signature : \_\_\_\_\_**

**3 February, 2003**

**Professor T.L. Gatchel, Advisor**

## Abstract

### FIGHTING ANOTHER BANANA WAR: CAMPAIGN PLANNING IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

The early twentieth-century foreign policy goal of preventing foreign intervention in Latin America and the current goal of preventing terrorist organizations intervention and operations in the Horn of Africa (HOA) are very similar.

The countries in the HOA represent a wide variation of governmental capabilities and sincerity regarding the apprehension and prosecution of global terrorists operating within their borders. These variations provide unique parallels to several countries in Latin America in the early 1900's which lacked national stability and therefore invited foreign intervention.

By conducting an analysis of three early 1900s military interventions in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic, this paper will determine how effective the use of military force is to conduct stability operations, and also point out the pitfalls of its use. Additionally, it will provide the key blocks for the Joint Task Force (JTF) HOA to build on in order to conduct a successful military campaign in the HOA.

To examine the Latin American interventions and how effective they were then, and how effective they might be today in a parallel country in the HOA, each action will be broadly analyzed utilizing the construct of ends, ways, means, risk, exit, and results.

The "results" of this collective analysis would lead us to believe that short-term stability can be achieved through military intervention. Therefore, it would seem that the keys to the successful use of U.S. military intervention to promote stability in the Horn of Africa lie in the lessons learned from the Banana Wars.

The early twentieth-century foreign policy goal of preventing foreign intervention in Latin America and the current goal of preventing terrorist organizations intervention and operations in the Horn of Africa (HOA) are very similar. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823<sup>1</sup> clearly identified European intervention in the Western Hemisphere to be a threat to U.S. peace and safety. The subsequent Roosevelt Corollary of 1904<sup>2</sup> claimed the right to utilize military force in a foreign nation when the internal conditions were such that "non-hemispheric" powers might gain undue influence or control. Arguably, these policies are still appropriate when non-government groups conspire to organize, operate and threaten the peace of our nation utilizing failed or tumultuous nation states as their sanctuary. Although the countries of the Horn of Africa extend well beyond our hemisphere, the global reach of the terrorists operating within this region make the rationale to exercise this doctrine, and its corollaries, apply.

The countries in the HOA represent a wide variation of governmental capabilities and sincerity regarding the apprehension and prosecution of global terrorists operating within their borders.<sup>3</sup> These variations provide unique parallels to several countries in Latin America in the early 1900's. Making the assumption that the United States National strategy calls for stability in the Horn of Africa region, and that the U.S. military will be used as the primary instrument of this policy, we can draw conclusions from the military interventions in Latin America that were also initiated to promote stability in the Western Hemisphere.<sup>4</sup> By conducting an analysis of the 1900s military interventions, this paper will determine how effective the use of military force is to conduct stability operations, and also point out the pitfalls of its use. Additionally, it will provide the key blocks for the Joint Task Force (JTF) HOA to build on in order to conduct a successful military campaign in this region.

Four major and several minor U.S. military actions took place in the early 1900s in Latin America.<sup>5</sup> Collectively these actions are cynically described as the "Banana Wars" in reference to the economic interests they were purported to protect. To highlight the strategic goal in the region as national stability rather than economic empire building, we will examine three of the major interventions that took place in the countries that had "the least American capital invested - Nicaragua, Haiti, [and] the Dominican Republic."<sup>6</sup> What the Americans expected in the Western Hemisphere was "orderly society populated by the law-abiding. These were the values not of Wall Street but of Main Street."<sup>7</sup> In all three studies, the desired goal of the United States was to promote stability, maintain U.S. hegemony in the Latin American hemisphere, and to protect American and European citizens and our nation's financial interests.

American diplomats feared that without the stability of Latin governments, the potential for foreign intervention would greatly increase in the ensuing chaos. Their fears proved correct in both Nicaragua and Haiti as European financial and diplomatic envoys attempted to take advantage of opportunities presented by both "left wing" rebellions and failing states. Specifically, in 1906, Nicaragua's dictator, Jose Santos Zelaya, strengthened his ties to Germany and Japan in an outward display of hostility towards the United States while also trying to enflame a Central American war amongst his neighbors.<sup>8</sup> In Haiti, a key port on the Windward Passage leading to the Panama Canal, the German Merchant community (which controlled 80 percent of Haiti's trade)<sup>9</sup> was actively manipulating the nation's politics. To Washington DC, the constant chaos of the turbulent countries and the imperialist or disruptive designs by foreign powers were an unacceptable mix.

To examine the Latin American interventions and how effective they were then, and how effective they might be today in a parallel country in the HOA, each action will be broadly analyzed utilizing the construct of ends, ways, means, risk, exit,<sup>10</sup> and results (Appendix A, Table 1). For common reference, the framework of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) will be utilized to categorize the various actions that were taken by the United States State Department and the military to promote stability. Although the interventions in Latin America of this time frame have not been identified as FID missions, their operational framework, tools, techniques and terms fit nicely under this construct. A brief explanation of FID and its spectrum of execution are included with Table 1.

In order to accomplish the "ends" of stability, hegemony, and security of our interests, the U.S. government utilized all elements of its national power in various forms throughout the hemisphere and in these countries specifically. The "ways," or sequence of actions, included the direct intervention of a landing force into all of the host nations. After accomplishing their military objective they either rapidly withdrew, or stayed to occupy the countries. In all three countries the U.S. military utilized Direct Support (including combat operations) and Direct Support (not including combat operations). In the Dominican Republic, the United States also utilized extensive Indirect Support to support the host nation's program of development.<sup>11</sup> Although the ends and ways were generally consistent in all the countries, the means, risk, and results must be examined individually.

In Nicaragua the Marines made two major interventions as a "means" to accomplish our foreign policy goals. The first of these occurred when the Marines landed to protect Bluefields in 1909. This coastal town had a large international population and heavy American and European corporate interests. Although this action has been looked upon as a

response to threatened economic interests, it was executed to defend American and European citizens and interests, and to protect the established government and ensure its hold on power.<sup>12</sup> By subsequently liberating Nicaragua's tools of industry (mines/ railroads), and conducting direct actions against the rebel strongholds of Coyotepe and Baranca, the United States cemented its hegemony in the Central American region. Once combat operations were completed in the country, the Marines established a legation guard to prevent further interference by internal forces and to provide long-term stability through presence and Security Assistance to the new government.

During the second intervention in Nicaragua in 1926, the Marines landed again to provide assistance to the host government and to protect the host nation's resources and commerce. With the U.S. force in place, special envoy Henry L. Stimson facilitated a political settlement.<sup>13</sup> Although most of the rebel forces agreed to this treaty, the Marines continued to support the host government conducting combat operations in the form of counter insurgency operations against the bandit Augusto Cesar Sandino and his rebel forces for over nine years. During this time the U.S. Military also conducted Direct Support (not involving combat operations) by providing humanitarian assistance to much of the country after a devastating earthquake struck the region.<sup>14</sup>

In Haiti, the "means " also included a landing by Marines. Direct Support (including combat operations) involved long-range patrolling and a protracted counterinsurgency campaign against the Cacos (heavily armed indigenous mercenaries) who had historically participated in destabilizing and overthrowing the national governments.<sup>15</sup> Although the Marines were violently effective at cleaning out the illegitimate resistance to the government, they also earned the endearing respect of the Haitian people for the sea soldier's humane

treatment and willingness to use unconventional methods to disarm the populace (e.g. buying back weapons at \$2 dollars a person).<sup>16</sup>

Direct Support (not including combat operations) was also necessary and effective in Haiti. The military forces provided administrative control of Port-au-Prince (including customs) and also established a military constabulary<sup>17</sup> which eventually ran all civil and military aspects of the country. This overt control was particularly effective and necessary in this country which had been run by elites with a limited desire to provide the basic humanitarian needs (food/ medical/ infrastructure) necessary to foster peace amongst their countrymen.

The Dominican Republic elicited a different initial response by the U.S. government. Indirect Support in the form of "Dollar Diplomacy"<sup>18</sup> was the preferred course of action to prevent the instability that had erupted after the chaotic fall of the government. Ultimately, this policy failed and the U.S. Marines landed at Manchedon City and eventually occupied the country. In an attempt to support a new government, the military force established martial law in the country and conducted extensive patrolling to pacify the hinterlands. Direct Support (not involving combat operations) included extensive humanitarian assistance after a hurricane hit the island and also came in the form of Security Assistance with the establishment of a military constabulary to facilitate government functions and security.

The initial foray into Nicaragua in 1909 entailed limited combat "risk" from rebel forces. The Marines were a well-armed and effective fighting force, which had general support from the population and the government. The rebel forces, although adequately equipped were not well led and did not have a significant motivation to repel the Marines.

Despite the seemingly risk free venture, there did exist the possibility for an escalation in hostilities between the Marines and the rebel forces, but this did not materialize.

In 1926, the United States did risk introducing its forces into the middle of a civil war.<sup>19</sup> The popular support from the people of Nicaragua was in question, and eventually did wane. Although the political climate did not support the military intervention, it also never materialized to the point of having a significant impact on operations in the country.

Despite its smaller size, the risks in Haiti were much greater than those of Nicaragua. Haiti was an intensely nationalist nation that would eventually chafe under occupation. The indigenous mercenaries, the Cacos, were well armed and well defended in the mountains. These fighters had been effective "guns for hire" to whoever had wished to overthrow the governments of the past. Although the Marines enjoyed the support of the population who were generally pleased with the de-facto United States rule, tensions would eventually build between the Marines and the elite local government which they had supplanted.

The risk in the Dominican Republic was much more limited. The stability that was provided by the occupying force benefited the economy and the government. Despite this, as the occupation went on, there became an increasing chance that the population would turn against the occupation force due to perceived and actual abuses of power by the Marines.<sup>20</sup> Additionally, there remained the low-level nuisance of resistance from the rebel forces in the hinterlands.

The exit strategy of 1909 in Nicaragua called for the abrupt and immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces.<sup>21</sup> A 100-man legation guard remained to keep the peace and promote stability. Arguably, it could be said that although the quick withdrawal was effective at getting the military forces out of the country after they accomplished their

mission, this action caused a vacuum that would eventually be filled by the leftist forces which the Marines would return to fight in 1926.

The exit of Nicaragua after the second intervention was less effective and the strategy unclear. Chasing the bandit Sandino had begun to produce negative results for the Marines. They were not losing the counterinsurgency fight, but not winning it either. Limited thought was given by the political establishment to promote an effective political situation upon the exit of the military force, which was evident, by the illegal actions of the government after the Marine's departure.<sup>22</sup> Ultimately, a lack of public support in Nicaragua and the United States caused the withdrawal.

An unclear exit strategy was also demonstrated in both Haiti and the Dominican Republic. In both cases the military force usurped control of the local government and then reinstalled it and kept the host government in power. By becoming the de-facto government, roots deepened to the point of dependency by the local population and more ominously the governments. In the case of Haiti, the Gendarmerie essentially became the government making it even more devastating after their withdrawal.<sup>23</sup> A loss of support from U.S. politicians and the U.S. public eventually caused a rapid withdrawal from both nations.

The "results" of this collective analysis would lead us to believe that short-term stability can be achieved through military intervention. In these examples, as well as several others throughout history, occupation and the ensuing martial law has demonstrated its effectiveness in this regard. It can provide many opportunities for failure as well.

During the intervention in Nicaragua, Marines achieved short-term stability for over 13 years between the two landings. The government of Nicaragua supported both interventions because it only had partial control of its country and was at risk of losing

control of the rest. The Marine's initial landing was limited in scope and achieved military objectives that were easily defended by the force. Though not wholly unpopular, the intervention kept the ruling party of Nicaraguan president Adolfo Diaz in power and assisted in developing an internal capability to police the nation. The abrupt withdrawal, although appearing shortsighted on the surface, served to effectively prevent a semi-capable government from becoming dependent on the United States military for its governing.

The establishment of the legation guard demonstrated a commitment of U.S. support and provided a means to re-enter the national dialogue by either negotiation or by force. Two other key points were highlighted in the chase of Sandino: First, in this large country, the Marines had insufficient forces to patrol the entire country leading to limited control and stability in the hinterlands. The second is that by being drawn into a counterinsurgency fight, the Marines had very little to gain and everything to lose.<sup>24</sup> As a foreign force conducting operations against an indigenous/ grass-roots enemy, the likelihood of losing the support of both the host nation population and the U.S. public was high. Although the U.S. Marines conducted a very successful campaign in the jungles of Nicaragua, it should have been fought predominately by host nation forces with our assistance.

Unlike Nicaragua, Haiti is a much smaller geographic area and had a government unable to provide peace or the basic necessities required by its citizens. In this case, pure military occupation may have been the most effective way to provide stability. By demonstrating a willingness to use force while also providing innovative ways to disarm the population and still treat the citizens in a humane manner, we created a "welcome force."<sup>25</sup> This fact was demonstrated by the general feeling that the 1920s are considered by many to be the most peaceful period in Haiti's history.

But again, as in Nicaragua, key points must be made. The first is that we were willing to conduct combat operations to eliminate the Cacos. We cannot lose resolve and willingness to conduct combat operations that may cause U.S. casualties if there exists a distinctly disruptive or dangerous threat to U.S. forces or any interim supported government. The second point is that if our nation determines that it must occupy a foreign country for a mutual good, we must be willing to stay until that country and all of its population are ready for our forces to leave. At first reading, the exit strategy of the Marines in Haiti may have seemed unclear. In retrospect a commitment of this type may not have an exit strategy for military forces in the short term, and we may have to accept that fact.

In the Dominican Republic, much like Haiti, we proved that we could provide short-term stability through occupation of a geographically limited area. What is key to bring out in the Dominican Republic is that when conducting military operations in support of a nation which has a central government but does not have control of its entire country, we risk doing its "dirty work" for it. This causes an unacceptable risk to U.S. forces and has a high potential for abuse by both the host nation and the occupying force. This situation will lead to a failed political atmosphere and a government that is not responsible to its people.

The "Gunboat Diplomacy" of the early 1900s was effective in bringing about the desired end-state of American foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere. The goal of continued economic access and revenues along with preventing foreign intervention was accomplished through the military interventions. The actions against local bandits and insurgents to prevent third party interventions will also be the necessary path to success in the HOA. This realization is key to the long-term commitment of providing stability in foreign countries in order to provide for our national security. It would seem that the keys to

the successful use of U.S. military intervention to promote stability in the Horn of Africa lie in the lessons learned from the Banana Wars.

Three key states in the Horn of Africa<sup>26</sup> share common links with the historical models of Latin America. Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen all have traits that are similar to the political, cultural, and national stability of early 1900s Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic respectively. Without trying to pound a round peg in a square hole, it may be useful to briefly compare the countries and their governmental span of control regarding stability. A more detailed comparison between the countries is available in Table 2.

Sudan, like Nicaragua, has been a war torn country. Although it maintains control of the majority of its country, it cannot provide for the well being of its citizens due to its internal conflict.<sup>27</sup> Like Nicaragua of the early 1900s, its lack of control has had a negative impact on its neighbors and the region. Internal instability has caused an environment ripe for foreign intervention, the build up of arms, and the threat of the regional spread of violence.

Somalia, like Haiti, is a violent country with a bloody history dominated by foreign intervention. Similar to the Haiti of the early 1900s, modern day Somalia has no effective government and its people exist at the whim of local warlords and clan leaders.<sup>28</sup> Like the Cacos of the Haitian north, these violent forces fight for the highest bidder with little regard for their countrymen. Unable to provide even the basic necessities for its people, this headless nation is ripe for intervention by outside forces.


Yemen is a country with a history of civil war. Despite its final consolidation of power at Saana, the government, like those of the historic Dominican Republic, "has been [unable] to intimidate the country's warring political factions."<sup>29</sup> Control of the western

portion of the nation is secure, but a tribal society dominates the remaining two thirds of the country.<sup>30</sup> This heavily armed populace operates with the same impunity as the 1900s rebel forces of the Dominican Republic's western frontier.

Promoting stability in the Horn of Africa can be accomplished by actions in the three key nations mentioned. Through chaos and war torn strife, these states have allowed their countries to become prime targets of foreign intervention by modern day terrorists. It is this chaos that provides the source of power allowing global terrorists organizations to operate freely and spread their violence beyond the fluid borders. This Center of Gravity (COG), "freedom of action," will only be vulnerable to a significant commitment of the United States' resources that are sequenced and synchronized over the long term.

The critical strengths, which support the terrorists' COG, are his inter-regional mobility, invisibility, and financial backing. Because of a collective lack of internal control in the key countries, and the porous nature of the regional borders (fostered by historic smuggling routes), the mobility of non-state actors is unimpeded. Ease of mobility factored with the lack of critical observation by the populace and the natural tendency of violent cultures to "mind their own business" has allowed the terrorists to live and operate freely with no questions asked, as if invisible. Financial backing greatly enhances both mobility and invisibility by providing the means to compensate a poor population's ignorance as well as maintain an appropriate level of security and offensive capability. While attacking these strengths in order to dislodge the terrorist's center of gravity we must be mindful of the lessons learned from our historical examples. Although the basics of the campaign plan can be viewed together in a schematic (Figure 1), it must be examined by broad phases and by individual key country to avoid the mistakes of the past.

Figure 1.  
General Campaign Flow Directed at Critical Strengths



Unlike the Latin American nations of the early 1900s, the Horn of Africa Nations are inextricably linked by the factors of time and space.<sup>31</sup> Actions taken in any one of the nations without consideration for the other nations in the region will make those actions ineffective. In contrast to modern day HOA, the individual actions in Latin America did not need to be directly linked through the sequencing of a greater campaign plan. Early communications and the isolated foreign economic interests allowed the interventions to occur over a long period of time without having a direct negative impact or influence between the separate actions. Conversely, current Global communication capabilities and sophisticated reporting and interaction between terrorists cells will cause the HOA JTF to synchronize and effectively sequence operations in order to be effective in the region. Because mobility throughout the region is a critical strength, closing off one axis of

movement while allowing freedom of movement in another will provide no pressure at all. Hence the critical function of synchronization in time.

It is important then to apply immediate actions across the region to prevent the ease of mobility. Through maritime positioning and coastal surveillance the JTF could quickly deter mobility across the Gulf of Aden and therefore the region. This should be coordinated with coastal nations to deter smuggling in conjunction with enforcement of international maritime law through Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) and Leadership Interdiction Operations (LIO) conducted by coalition and U.S. naval forces.

Simultaneously we should work with the bordering nations Saudi Arabia and Oman as well as Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti to enhance their border control. Engagement through "dollar diplomacy" and Security Assistance would provide immediate incentive to tighten border patrol activity. Although important to engage diplomatically and economically, it would be most effective to support these activities with operational fires and U.S. or coalition forces. These forces acting independently to conduct Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), or with host nation forces would demonstrate our commitment while allowing intelligence gathering and promoting a credible deterrent to inter-theater movement. As we move into the short-term phase of this campaign to attack "invisibility," we must turn to actions in the key states themselves.

In Sudan, we must be willing to conduct limited combat operations against targets that are determined to be a threat to the international community or other countries in the region. Short-term actions against limited objectives that can be defended must be an option. As in Nicaragua, our legitimacy should be based on our national interests rather than support of the host government. If invited to assist the Sudanese government, we should be willing

to "keep the trains running" by providing humanitarian assistance and other Direct Support (not involving combat operations) if required. The key pitfall to be avoided is "chasing Sandino." Because of its central position and multiple borders, we will not be able to "stabilize" this country through occupation. Regardless of where we apply pressure, targets will spill out of the area like the bandit Sandino did in Nicaragua. If we move beyond limited strikes or clearly defined operations we will become embroiled in this country and put our forces at unnecessary risk.

In Somalia, we must consider occupation. Landing forces to provide the people with an effective government as we did in Haiti would be the only effective means to stabilize this complicated nation. Determining key landing sites through "cultural IPB" could determine areas that would be receptive to U.S. intervention. Humane treatment of the population and extensive humanitarian assistance as well as financial incentives would provide the incentive for the population to disarm. Once established in the country we must make the hard decision to "go after the Cacos." Like the early criminals of the Haitian north, well-armed and violent clans will resist a civil society regardless of the benefits to their countrymen. Hunting down and eradicating this internal resistance while rebuilding the countryside through effective patriarchy is a dichotomy that has proven effective when our resources are appropriately committed. Providing an exit from this type of scenario is difficult at best. The key to effective execution may lie in not discussing a short-term exit strategy at all. Rather, we should accept a long-term solution to this problem and commit the resources necessary to build a country we are willing to withdraw from.

In Yemen, "dollar diplomacy" and extensive Security Assistance would be the most effective tools. In this extremely xenophobic society, we cannot go into the "frontier"

unilaterally. Like the real and purported abuses in the Dominican Republic, the Yemeni people would always be distrustful of a foreign force in their country. The tribal nature of their society can only be penetrated by members of that tribe. Security Assistance including equipment and intensive training of a Yemeni force would be key to eradicating invisibility in Yemen.

Attacking the critical strength of financial capability may prove to be somewhat more elusive for military forces in the short term. Although this is an important pillar of the global terrorist's foundation, it does not need to be attacked by the military forces directly. Through a stable countryside and a well cared for population, we can offset the negative influence of terrorist blood money. This strength will therefore be eliminated as a byproduct of stability overall.

The initial actions of the War on Terrorism (principally operations in Afghanistan) have been conducted in the “traditional” manner of military intervention. That is to say, they were conducted against a definable enemy with generally clear military objectives that have been prosecuted in pursuit of National strategy and policy objectives. Similar operations could be imagined in other nation states that have regimes that sponsor terrorism. More difficult to design will be operations in states that have either no recognized governments, or governments that cannot effectively control their populations or territories.

The challenges of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) will bring the U.S. military and our nation to regions of the world in which we would prefer not to operate. The complexity of the inter-relations between failed states, regional powers, and governments which cannot provide their own internal security will require a long view of operations which we may not have wanted to consider in recent times. With the establishment of a Joint Task

Force to operate in the Horn of Africa (HOA) we may be seeing a more accurate representation of the most likely type of operations and operational challenges in the GWOT. Analyzing potential operations in the Horn of Africa may provide the model for which future operations in other regions of the world could be accomplished.

As we consider the military interventions in Latin America and their level of success it cannot be disputed that they provided the measure of stability necessary to prevent foreign intervention in the Western Hemisphere. Looking to the past may give us the confidence and resolve to make the hard choices necessary to ensure our nations security. Keen analysis of potential pitfalls and a willingness to commit our forces when, where, and for as long as we deem necessary will pave the road to success when fighting another Banana War in the Horn of Africa.

## NOTES

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3. Edmonson, George, "Rumsfeld off to Horn of Africa, US hopes to enlist nations to fight terror." Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 10 December 2002, [Early-Bird on-line publication]; available from <http://ebird.dtic.mil/Dec2002/e20021210141291.html>; accessed on 10 December 2002.
4. Langley, Lester D, The Banana Wars, An Inner History of American Empire 1900-1934, (The University Press of Kentucky, 1983), p. 58.
5. Authors and historians include several different military and political actions in Latin America when describing the collective Banana Wars. This author considers the four major actions to be the interventions in Cuba, Nicaragua, Mexico, and the island of Hispaniola (Dominican Republic and Haiti).
6. Boot, Max, The Savage Wars of Peace, Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, (Basic Books, New York, NY, 2002), p. 140.
7. Musicant, Ivan, The Banana Wars, A History of the United States Military Intervention in Latin America from the Spanish-American War to the Invasion of Panama, (Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, NY, 1990), p. 8.
8. Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, p.141.
9. Ibid., 159.
10. The ends, ways, means, risk, and exit construct is utilized by the Joint Military Operations Department at the Naval War College to analyze military actions in the broader framework of operational art. This author added results in order to analyze the effectiveness of the military interventions in Latin America.
11. Joint Pub 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 26 June 1996), p. viii.
12. Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, p.145.
13. Ibid., 235.
14. Davis, Burke, Marine!: The life of Chesty Puller, (Little, Brown & Company, Boston, 1962), p. 64.
15. Langley, The Banana Wars, An Inner History of American Empire 1900-1934, p. 124.
16. Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, p. 160.

17. Davis, Marine!: The life of Chesty Puller, p. 27.
18. "Dollar Diplomacy" was a phrase coined by Secretary of State Philander C. Knox and President William Howard Taft to describe the foreign policy method of sending "dollars instead of bullets" to foreign shores. This might allow the U.S. to achieve its goals of stable Latin American states without resorting to armed intervention. Additionally, it undermined European financial strength in Latin America by replacing European creditors with American ones. Langley, The Banana Wars, An Inner History of American Empire 1900-1934, p.64,65.
19. Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, p. 234.
20. Ibid., 170.
21. Ibid., 148.
22. Ibid., 247.
23. Ibid., 166.
24. Ibid., 252.
25. Ibid., 176.
26. This author considers the Horn of Africa as a region including Yemen, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya. Additionally, it includes the southern Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and all coastal waters of the aforementioned countries.
27. "Yemen-Country Overview and History," in Country Watch 30 November 2002 [database on-line]; available from [http://www.countrywatch.com/cw\\_country.asp?vcountry=188/](http://www.countrywatch.com/cw_country.asp?vcountry=188/) accessed on 30 November 2002.
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Appendix A Table 1.

	<b>NICARAGUA</b>	<b>HAITI</b>	<b>DOMINICAN REPUBLIC</b>
<b>ENDS:</b> What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal?	-Protect American and European citizens and financial interests (3/140) -Promote stability in the hemisphere (3/141,232)(6/58) -Maintain US hegemony in the Latin American hemisphere (3/129)(6/53)	-Prevent European influence in hemisphere (principally Germany) (6/123,124) -Protect American and Foreign citizens and financial interests (6/123) -Promote stability in the hemisphere (3/157,158)(6/124) -Maintain US hegemony in the Latin American hemisphere	-Prevent European influence in hemisphere (principally Germany) (6/123,124) -Protect American and Foreign citizens and financial interests (6/121) -Promote stability in the hemisphere (3/157,158) -Maintain US hegemony in the Latin American hemisphere
<b>WAYS:</b> What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition?	-Direct Support (including combat operations) to defend American and European interests (3/145)(6/53) -Protect the established Government and ensure its hold on power (3/145,233) -Liberate tools of industry (mines/ railroads) and prevent prohibitive interference (3/145,146) -Establish local militia to provide long term stability through Security Assistance (10/56)(3/141,232,244,246)	-Direct Support (including combat operations) to defend American and Foreign interests (3/158) -Direct Support (not including combat operations) (3/160) -Provide Administrative Control of Port-au-Prince (including customs) (3/160,161) -Support implanting new Government (6/133) -Clean out resistance to government (6/124) -Establish Constabulary (10/27)(3/165) -Run all civil and military aspects of country (3/166)	-Indirect Support "Dollar Diplomacy" (3/137) -Direct Support (including combat operations) to defend American and Foreign interests (6/119) -Support implanting new Government (3/137,168) -Established Martial Law in country (3/170) -Establish Constabulary (3/170)
<b>MEANS:</b> How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions?	-(1909) Land Marines to protect Bluefields (3/142,144) -Direct actions against rebel strongholds of Coyote/Baranca (3/147) -Establish "legation guard" (3/233) -(1926) Land Marines to provide Security Assistance to Host Government and protect nations resources and commerce (3/233) -Facility political settlement (Stimson) (3/235) -Combat Operations (counter insurgency) Sandino and rebel forces (3/252) -Humanitarian Assistance (earthquake) (3/248)(10/64)	-Landed Marines west of Port-au-Prince (3/157) -Buy back weapons "\$2 a head" (3/160) -Humanitarian assistance food/medical -Counterinsurgency against Cacos (only real opposition) (10/27)(3/163) -Combat ops-patrolling (3/165) -human treatment/ money (3/165) -Gendamarie become government (3/166)(10/45)	-Landed Marines Manchedon City (3/169) -Occupy country -Humanitarian assistance (3/170) -Establish Constabulary -Combat ops-patrolling (3/171)
<b>RISK:</b> What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?	-(1909) Limited combat risk from rebel forces -General support from population and Government -(1926) Potential to enter civil war (3/234) -significant chance of escalation (3/239) -popular support from population in question	-Nationalist nation who would eventually buck occupation (6/133) -Cacos well armed/ well defended in mountains (3/163) -Marines enjoyed support of locals (6/138) -Tensions between Marines and local government (3/166) -Population generally pleased with de-facto United States rule (3/176)	-Limited combat risk -Chance population could turn against perceived or actual abuses of the Marines (3/170,171) -Low level nuisance of resistance from rebel forces (3/171)
<b>EXIT:</b> What resources must be committed or actions performed to successfully execute the JFC's exit strategy?	-(1909) Immediate withdrawal of forces (3/148) -100 man legation guard remained to keep the peace and promote stability (3/232,233) -(1926) Unclear strategy (235) -Chase of Sandino began to produce negative results. (3/241,242) -Limited thought given to promote effective political situation upon exit (3/247) -Lack of public support in country or US causes ultimate withdrawal (3/248,249)	-Unclear strategy after usurping control of governments and then propping them up (3/161,162) -Became de-facto government which caused roots to deepen (6/8) -Loss of support from US politicians and US public cause rapid withdrawal (3/177)	-Unclear strategy after usurping control of governments and then propping them up (3/161,162) -Became de-facto government which caused roots to deepen -Loss of support from US politicians and US public cause rapid withdrawal
<b>RESULTS:</b> What might be the short and long term results of these actions?	-(1909) short term stability (13 years) -Kept ruling party in power (Diaz) (3/233) -(1926) Clean elections in country under US military direct supervision (3/243) -Insufficient forces to patrol entire country during occupation led to limited control/stability in the hinterlands (3/247)	-Short term stability through occupation -Legislative elections fairest in history (3/166) -1920's most peaceful in Haiti's history (3/179) -Eventually left with honor -Accomplished goals/ ends -Effective counterinsurgency operations(3/180)	-Short term stability through occupation -Eventually left with honor -Accomplished goals/ ends -Effective counterinsurgency operations

#### Historical analysis of Military Intervention utilizing FID constructs\*

Annotations are based on source number and page from bibliography references

(e.g. (1/94) refers to page 94 of source 1. Anderson, Thomas D. Geopolitics of the Caribbean, Ministates in a Wider World.)

Appendix A Table 1.  
Historical analysis of Military Intervention utilizing FID constructs

A-1

**\*From the Executive Summary of Joint Pub 3-07.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)**

## **Introduction**

The focus of all United States Foreign Internal Defense (FID) efforts is to support the Host Nation's (HN) program of internal defense and development. These national programs are designed to free and protect a nation from lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency by emphasizing the building of viable institutions that respond to the needs of the society. The most significant manifestation of these needs is likely to be economic, social, informational, or political; therefore, these needs should prescribe the principle focus of US efforts. Nevertheless, military assistance is often necessary to provide the secure environment for these efforts to become effective.

## **DOD FID Tools**

**Indirect support** emphasizes the principles of HN self-sufficiency and builds strong national infrastructures through economic and military capabilities. It includes Security Assistance (SA), joint and combined exercises, and exchange programs.

**Direct Support (not involving combat operations)** involves the use of US forces providing direct assistance to the HN civilian populace or military. These are joint- or Service-funded, do not usually involve the transfer of arms and equipment, and do not usually include training local military forces. Direct Support (not involving combat operations) includes civil-military operations, intelligence and communications sharing, and logistics.

**Direct Support (involving combat operations)** is primary mission of the combatant commanders and other joint force commanders. They are responsible to prepare for war, and if engaged in war, to terminate on terms favorable to the United States.

Appendix A Table 2.

A-2

COUNTRY	SUDAN	NICARAGUA (1900-1930)
SIZE	2,505,810 Square KM(17/1)	129,494 Square KM(15/1)
BORDERS	Ethiopia, Chad, Egypt, Central African Republic, Congo, Eritrea, Uganda, Libya, Kenya(17/2)	Honduras, Costa Rica(15/2)
POPULATION	36,841,500(17/1)	Estimated less than 1 million (1/21)
GOVERNMENT	Began secular but series of coups introduced Islamic state including sharia (Islamic law). Engaging in activities outside borders(17/3-5)	Run by president Zelaya. Interfered across its borders and surrounding region. Attempted to overthrow government of Honduras.(3/141)
ARMED FORCES	Currently engaged in fighting with southern secessionists.(17/6,7)(21/1,2)	Engaged to prevent rebellions by several different groups(3/142)(6/184)
COLONIAL HISTORY	Ottoman-Egyptian, British-Egyptian(17/3)	Spanish, British(1/91)
FOREIGN INTERVENTION	UN and US attempts to deliver food aid marginally effective due to internal strife(17/6)	German, Japanese, British, U.S.(1/89-96)
INTERNAL STRIFE	Engaged in civil war based largely on religious persecution of Christian minority in south.(17/4-6)	Leftist rebels opposing government mounted campaign to attack government and foreign interest(6/64)
RESULTS: CURRENT/ HISTORICAL ENVIRONMENT REGARDING STABILITY	-War torn country which cannot provide for the well being of its citizens due to conflict. Situation is influencing actions beyond its borders (refugees/military actions).(17/3-7)(24/1,2)	Verge of civil war. Government lacked capability to protect its citizens or foreign interests from leftists rebels. (6/64, 182-192)

COUNTRY	SOMALIA	HAITI (1900-1930)
SIZE	637,660 Square KM(16/1)	27,750 Square KM(14/1)
BORDERS	Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti(16/2)	Dominican Republic(14/2)
POPULATION	11,101,800(16/1)	Estimated less than 1 million (1/21)
GOVERNMENT	No effective government(20/2)	In a state of turmoil. Changing with mercenaries(3,157,160)
ARMED FORCES	Dissolved with the government in the early 1990s(16/4,5)	Limited govt. capability, strength of nation lies with Cacos (heavily armed mercenaries)(10/27)(3/163)
COLONIAL HISTORY	British, Italian(16/3)	French(3/157)
FOREIGN INTERVENTION	Soviet Union provides arms. UN peacekeepers brought to feed people(16/5,6)	U.S. and European economic intervention(heavy German merchant community)(6/123)(3/163)
INTERNAL STRIFE	Insurgencies from western borders (Ethiopia) caused government to unravel when compounded with economic conditions.(20/1)	Politically unstable country exacerbated by use of mercenaries that provide the muscle to rising political entities.(3/157)
RESULTS: CURRENT/ HISTORICAL ENVIRONMENT REGARDING STABILITY	Chaotic state with no central government. Heavily armed tribal population is resistant to foreign intervention(16/6)	Rapidly decaying state with no effective central control of people or capability to provide basic humanitarian requirements. Heavily armed population.(3/156,160)

COUNTRY	YEMEN	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (1900-1930)
SIZE	527,970 Square KM(18/1)	48,730 Square KM(13/1)
BORDERS	Saudi Arabia, Oman(18/2)	Haiti(13/2)
POPULATION	16,650,900(18/1)	Estimated less than 1 million (1/21)
GOVERNMENT	Consolidated into single government with secular framework(18/5)	Changed hands many times. Several coups left unstable government by "strongmen"(3/168,169)
ARMED FORCES	Years of civil war. Incapable of controlling large portions of the country.(18/5,6)	No control over hinterlands. Forces in power controlled through force(6/119)
COLONIAL HISTORY	Ottoman , Arab and British influence(18/3)	Spanish(6/119)(3/167)
FOREIGN INTERVENTION	Limited beyond international diplomatic efforts(18/3-5)	Principally economic by Europe. U.S. intervention frequent to quell unrest(6/121)
INTERNAL STRIFE	Historic split between north and south. Heavy tribal influence in hinterlands(18/5,6)(23/3)	Rebel forces operate freely spurned on by strong arm policies of government(3/168)
RESULTS: CURRENT/ HISTORICAL ENVIRONMENT REGARDING STABILITY	Civil unrest throughout country. Lack of control beyond western highlands. Tribal society dominant. Heavily armed populace.(18/5,6)(23,3,4)	Lack of roads in frontier allows rebels to operate with little interference from government. Unstable country. (6/119)(3/168)

### Country Comparison Chart

Annotations are based on source number and page from bibliography references

(e.g. (1/94) refers to page 94 of source 1. Anderson, Thomas D. Geopolitics of the Caribbean, Ministates in a Wider World.)

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<sup>1</sup> This Bibliography is numbered to allow the annotations in Tables 1 and 2 to correspond to the source number and page from the bibliography references.  
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